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  Editorial by Mladjan Dinkic
  
      Is the year 2000 going to be a year of changes? 
      As in all New Year's greetings, the President self-confidently promised a year of economic 
prosperity. All grandiose works on the reconstruction of the country will be carried on. The 
Government will, as always, keep the exchange rate and the prices stable, while a two-digit 
industrial production growth rate was also promised. Hence, from the stand-point of the regime, 
changes are not at all necessary, as continuous growth of the standard of living will be secured, to 
guarantee nonchalance to the citizens and arm them with extra strength while they queue for 
bread, milk, cooking oil and sugar. 
      In reality, Serbia is in despair, and so are its citizens. Although people try to appear normal in 
daytime and before the external world, even with smiling faces, many cannot sleep at night. The 
number of funerals in January 2000 rose by 40% compared with the same period last year. Owing 
to the shortage of medicaments, caused by the policy of price controls, private pharmacies register 
a dramatic expansion in the sale of antidepressants, sold at free market prices. After neurosis of all 
sorts, contracted because of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, years-long bloody and utterly 
futile civil wars, the NATO bombardment and catastrophic decline in the standard of living, what 
threatens to finish off the citizens of Serbia is the lack of prospects for economic and national 
revival. In the internationally isolated country, hopelessness and apathy of most of its citizens 
cannot be eliminated by ready-made promises given by some politicians who are also paranoid, as 
they try to persuade themselves as well as others that progress and prosperity are possible without 
cooperation with the developed West, drawing instead on the policy of self-reliance and the help of 
"friends" from Russia, Belarus, China, Iraq and Libya. 
FRY: basic economic indicators 
 1999 1998 1999.1998 XII '99 
XII '99 
XI '99 
XII '99
XII '98 
GDP (USD mill) 14.224a) 17.626a) -19,3%       
Montenegro   1.103         
Serbia   16.523         
GDP per capita (USD) 1.699a) 2.100a) -19,1%       
Montenegro   1.704         
Serbia   2.133         
Serbia proper   1.977         
Vojvodina   2.590         
Industrial production     -24,1%   3,8% -14,8%
Montenegro     -7,6%   26,3% -9,6%
Serbia     -25,6%   2,6% -15,1%
Serbia proper     -24,5%   7,6% -11,6%
Vojvodina     -28,2%   -7,5% -22,5%
Average wage (DM) 107b) 156 -31,7% 93b) 6,3% -38,1%
Montenegro 154 180 -14,1% 161 16,8% -8,0%
Serbia 102b) 155 -33,8% 88b) 5,4% -40,6%
Unemployment rate, Serbia 26,6%c) 24,7%c) 7,7%       
Export (USD mill) 1.498 2.820 -46,9% 123 -13,7% -54,9%
Montenegro 123 129 -4,7% 6,5 -51,1% -21,3%
Serbia 1.375 2.691 -48,9% 116,0 -9,8% -55,9%
Import (USD mill) 3.296 4.732 -30,3% 305 6,9% -9,8%
Montenegro 358 335 6,9% 21 -33,6% -34,5%
Serbia 2.938 4.397 -33,2% 279 11,3% -8,1%
Money supply M1 (Din billion), at the 
end of period 16,4 10,8 51,9% 16,4 3,9% 51,9%
Cash 6,7 5,0 34,0% 6,7 9,3% 34,0%
Deposits 9,7 5,8 67,2% 9,7 1,0% 67,2%
Real money supply (DM million), at the 
end of period 739 1.280 -42,3% 739 -5,7% -42,3%
Market interest rate, monthly level 4,25% 6,95% -38,8% 3,89% -12,4% -44,2%
Retail price     42,4%a)   0,8%a) 50,1%
Montenegro     60,1%   20,8% 128,4%
Serbia     41,1%a)   -0,7%a) 45,4%
Costs of living     44,9%a)   2,2% 53,9%
Montenegro     67,2%   23,2% 145,3%
Serbia     43,5%a)   0,2%a) 47,9%
Cost price     44,2%a)   3,0% 61,1%
Montenegro     63,7%   17,3% 131,2%
Serbia     43,2%a)   1,6%a) 58,3%
Black market exchange rate (din/DM) 12,6 6,7 88,1% 20,0 5,3% 150% 
1 Official statistics; without Kosovo; unreliable 
2 Estimates 
3 Official statistics, September 1999, Serbia without Kosovo; changed methodology includes the employed; unreliable 
  
  
      Even if the "promises of paradise" given by years-long liars came true would this mean 
anything to a nation which is literally dying out? Given that the industrial production in 1999 was 
72% lower than ten years ago, not even a two-digit growth rate could do much to improve our 
miserable situation. Namely, even with the statistically significant growth of 10%, this year’s 
production would only reach the level which is 70% lower than it was in 1989. We wonder whether 
the citizens of Serbia would feel a noteworthy improvement in the standard even if the last year’s 
average salary of DM 88, rose by 20% due to "the extraordinary efforts of the Government", to a 
sum of full 106 German marks at the end of this year. 
      Temporary cyclic improvements at the bottom of the economic abyss, Serbia has been going 
through since 1993, are just not enough to incite the hope of citizens in a truly better life. There is 
no doubt that even the present government, incompetent and compromised as it is, can secure 
such minor economic progress. Let us recall that back in 1997, after the sale of the Serbian 
Telecom Company and the provision of one billion dollars from abroad, this government managed 
to secure temporary macroeconomic stability in the electoral year. Real incomes actually had a 
two-digit growth. However, immediately after the elections they suffered a two-digit fall. Taking into 
account that this year is also the electoral year, we assume that a similar scenario will be 
attempted again. But, as the EU sanctions are in effect, banning foreign investments in Serbia, the 
regime is forced to secure the foreign assets needed for temporary maintenance of the stability of 
the exchange rate in a completely different manner. Last year, after the alarming growth of the 
black market exchange rate of 150% (by the way, the government had the nerve to proclaim it a 
success in the policy of stabilization), which was the result of large money issue without the 
backing by official reserves of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, it was clear that the situation could 
have easily escaped control. Although back in 1993 the regime had already won the elections in 
the time of hyperinflation, knowing what happened in the meantime, it has decided not to play with 
the voters and their electoral will this time. In December last year it was announced that our 
government received a "gift" worth 300 million US$ from the government of China. Taking into 
account that the Chinese are not famous for their altruism, this is obviously the case of repatriation 
of a part of the money that was previously taken out from Serbia to Cyprus, Israel and Greece, and 
then after the EU financial sanctions had been introduced, partially transferred to the accounts of 
the Serbian political establishment in China, South Africa, Lebanon, etc. This money was already 
used to intervene at the foreign exchange market last December, in order to check the increase of 
the foreign exchange rate, resulting in its stabilization at a level of 20 dinars to 1 German mark 
(black market exchange rate) and 25 dinars to 1 German mark (giro exchange rate). According to 
our estimates and taking into account a relatively low level of the current economic activity, this 
unexpected inflow of foreign currency reserves should be sufficient to maintain the stability of 
foreign exchange rate at least by the end of May, 2000 providing that an adequate monetary policy 
is pursued. Hence, it would not come as a surprise if this regime decides to hold local elections 
even this spring. 
      However, short-term stability of the foreign exchange rate and a temporary increase in the real 
incomes of the population, which are objectively possible with a quick depletion of foreign currency 
reserves, do not guarantee that the current regime will win the elections this time. Contrary to the 
developed Western democracies, where the electoral results are, as a rule, proportional to the 
success of the government achieved in its economic and social policy, the experience of Serbia is 
quite the opposite. Namely, the ruling elite relatively easily won all elections held under conditions 
of extremely negative economic trends (hyperinflation, drastic decline of the standard of living, 
growth of unemployment), while during its pre-election campaigns it deliberately incited fear that 
the situation could become much worse and that only the regime was capable of preventing its 
further deterioration. In addition, national-political motives, such as "the struggle for the Serbian 
national interest" (never defined precisely), "the struggle to keep Serbian territories", the fear of 
spreading the war and the loss of closest family members, etc. at that time had a key role in 
determining the voters' behavior. Today, the situation is very much different. Almost all territories 
have been lost, many lost their lives in vain, the true patriots have been disgraced and the fake 
promoters of the Serbian national interest are still sitting in their armchairs. This time the economic 
and social motives will be decisive for the voters' behavior. In such circumstances, an illusion of 
economic recovery, that the regime might create in the first months of 2000, would only be another 
proof that things, objectively, could be better, and, contrary to the desire of the regime, an 
additional motive for the voters to vote for those capable of providing the progress much faster. 
Obviously, the ruling elite - unable even to obtain visas of other countries - stands no chance in 
such a race, as the latest results of public opinion polls show that the majority of the population is 
fully aware that genuine economic recovery of Serbia and initiation of the economic growth are 
possible only after Serbia becomes fully integrated into the international community. 
      Hence, economic and political analyses claim that democratic opposition should have an easy 
task at the elections this year. The authoritarian regime is also aware of that, as it draws 
increasingly uncontrolled moves. Since the repression against the free media and the destruction 
of the university and the judiciary have failed to provide sufficient guarantee to prolong their rule, 
certain members of the ruling coalition, have, of late, started hysterically inviting a conflict with 
Montenegro. Others attempt to publicly demonstrate their "power", by threatening with the return of 
our army to Kosovo by force, despite the fact that it has previously left it to NATO soldiers. We 
believe that a conflict with Montenegro is unlikely to occur. Bearing in mind the hitherto 
exceptionally clever political tactics of the Montenegrin authorities, we expect that a referendum on 
the independence of Montenegro, which might provoke a new conflict, will not be held in the first 
half of this year. Serbia broke off the payment transactions in November 1999, and Montenegro is 
de facto no longer within the economic and legal system of the FRY. On the other hand, an attack 
of the Serbian army units on NATO forces in Pristina could be organized only by those who wish a 
prompt arrival of NATO in Belgrade, and we are not sure that the regime, despite its patriotic 
vocabulary, is currently able to host the NATO officers. 
      To conclude, after everything that happened in our country over the past ten years, the key of 
the electoral victory and the chance for a "fresh start" in Serbia are finally in the hands of the 
democratic opposition. Of the entire arsenal of economic measures and political filth the regime will 
use to stay in power, only one can be effective - dividing the opposition which has become united 
at the beginning of the year, i.e. to corrupt some of its key leaders. However, if opposition remains 
united and goes to all elections (local, republican and federal) with one electoral list and with a 
single program platform, it will attract the majority of the voters who are currently indecisive and 
who make over 40% of the electorate. In that case, the opposition cannot lose under any electoral 
conditions. Time will show whether the opposition in Serbia truly wishes the victory that is now at 
arm’s length. 
  Analysis by Branko Radulovic
  
A decade of devastation 
  
In the first issue of the Yugoslav Economic Monthly, we wish to introduce our readers to the origin 
and development of the economic situation in the FRY, i.e. in Serbia. In that purpose we shall 
present facts and developmental indicators that dominated the last decade. Factors that enabled 
such longevity of negative tendencies - a lack of growth and macroeconomic imbalance, will also 
be interpreted. Yugoslavia is certainly one of the countries whose economy requires a whole range 
of additional indicators to obtain full insight in its state and movements. They will not change 
primary conclusions, but they are necessary for understanding the real nature of the situation. 
Anyhow, with or without them, the state of economy in Yugoslavia is, mildly speaking, dramatic. It 
is obvious even at first glance and our duty here is to provide analytical verification. 
  
      It is rather easy to explain the reasons for the disastrous situation in Yugoslav economy by 
three factors. The first one is institutional by nature, as the current regime is unwilling to commence 
the necessary reforms. This reason, together with inadequate, sometimes destructive economic 
policy and frequent external blows - has led to the culmination of existing problems. 
      The above-mentioned factors have created a large difference between the potential and 
achieved GDP. Between 1990-1999, Yugoslav economy (without accounts for Kosovo) registered 
an average annual growth rate of around -7%, reducing the GDP in 1999 to the level of 50% of that 
in 19901. In a hypothetical case of peaceful disintegration of the SFRY after Slovenia's separation, 
and assuming that the growth rates of Slovenian GDP were registered between 1990-1999, the 
FRY, without Kosovo, would cumulatively gain US$ 82 billion more than it actually achieved. It is 
slightly less than 6 GDPs for the same region in 1999. This figure was calculated on the basis of 
official statistics, so it is reasonable to assume that the lost GDP was even larger. There is no 
doubt that drastic growth of the lost GDP 
occured after the last year's war.2 
      Circulus vitiosus (low income-low 
savings-low investments-low productivity) 
is one of the main characteristics of 
Yugoslav economy. Chronic shortage of 
capital additionally expanded the existing 
problem in the respective period. Except 
for rare cases, Yugoslav economy had not 
only has access to the world capital 
market, but it also experienced immense 
capital flight, especially in the beginning of 
the 90's. This fact is very important in 
view of the "dependence" between 
Yugoslav economic development and the 
extent of foreign accumulation. 
      The industrial production accurately 
reproduces the GDP movement. Until 
1999, many sectors in the industry 
reduced their production to several 
percents only, compared to 1989. During 
the respective period, the share of industry in the total GDP had been reduced at the expense of 
agriculture and only decent examples were the electric power industry and oil industry (until this 
year). Shortage of fresh capital, working assets and investments, together with a loss of markets 
and obsolete equipment, generate huge problems that deepen the recession and intensify the 
process of de-industrialization of Yugoslav economy. 
      In addition to the drastic drop of the production, Yugoslavia experienced extensive price 
instability. Between 1989-1994 the economy survived two hyperinflations. The second lasted over 
20 months, reaching 3,31 x 108 at its peak in January 1994. Hyperinflation had both exogenous - 
disintegration of the state, war, transition of the economic system, external economic blows, and 
endogenous factors - deliberate incitement of hyperinflation by the political elite aimed at re-
distribution of wealth. Technically speaking, the second hyperinflation was caused by monetization 
of the deficit. It was halted in February 1994 by the implementation of an orthodox program which 
gained relative success in the first stage of its implementation - until October 1994, when, owing to 
the inconsistency in conducting the financial discipline, structural changes and privatization, 
negative tendencies emerged again. 
      Because of the enduring experience 
with hyperinflation and accented inflatory 
expectations, the economy formed a 
rather short time lag between the 
movements of money, prices and 
production. According to the official 
statistics in 1999 consumer price rose by 
45%. This figure, like others from the 
same source, is doubtful not only because 
of the applied measuring method, but also 
because of the presence of repressed 
inflation as a consequence of extensive 
price control. The government uses 
monetary policy, subsidizing by selected 
credits and price control so as to reduce 
inflatory pressures and buy itself some 
time. The possibility of utilizing monetary 
policy reflects a low degree of the central 
bank personal and financial 
independence. Short-lived mandates, when there was no governor for some time, as well as high 
and frequent deviations from the planned movement of money supply, the approval of credits for 
quasi-budget activities (to social security funds, the electric power industry, etc.) illustrate this high 
degree of dependence. 
      Let us mention a few additional characteristics of Yugoslav economy. During the period 
between the program of monetary reconstruction and the bombardment (1994-1999), it 
experienced mild recovery, but important 
systematic changes failed to occur. It is 
still based on "social" property, state 
ownership and a questionable 
motivational system, and consequently on 
soft budget constraints. The process of 
privatization has not gone any further, but 
it has also been reversible. 
      Accumulation of debts created during 
the last two decades proceeded in the 
90's as well. The problem of external debt 
has never been seriously resolved, so it 
grows by US$ 700-750 million at the 
annual level. The estimate of the total 
external debt is around US$ 12-12,5 
billion, while there are no official data on 
its actual size. External debt is slightly 
higher than the estimated GDP and in the 
near future it will become the chief 
problem of Yugoslav economy. 
      According to the official statistics, the registered unemployment rate was constantly growing, 
but it did not correspond to other indicators. Although extremely high, such an unemployment rate 
is far from reality. The number of fictively employed is rather high, accounting for 30-40% of the 
total number of employed, according to estimates. 
      Apart from a significant decline of employment, resulting from the liberal regime of retirement - 
early retirement and disability pensioners, the number of pensioners has increased 
correspondingly. The annual rate is 3-4%. In such a manner, high pressure is exerted on the 
employed through contributions for social and pension insurance. During the whole respective 
period the dependency ratio between employed and pensioners had been deteriorating. It dropped 
under 2 for the first time in 1995. The problem lies in an actual “pay as you go” system in its late 
stage, with all the predicaments that accompany it. Inability to transfer the tax burden to other 
payers, i.e. financing through other taxes (for example, income tax) is a further disadvantage. 
Demographic movements can consequently initiate the fiscal deficit. 
      One of the dominant characteristics of Yugoslav economy is a chronic trade deficit reproduced 
in the balance of payments deficit. Cumulative trade deficit in the respective period was around 
US$ 15 billion. The question frequently asked is - how was it financed? Four elements answer this 
question. 
      Firstly, the current account deficit is much lower due to surplus in the service sector and net 
factor incomes. 
      Secondly, the balance of payments deficit was covered out of assets deriving either from 
capital flight during the first years of the disintegration of the SFRY or from the sale of the Telecom 
Serbia. It is up to certain extent obvious from the balance of payments that net errors and 
omissions have a dominant role in making up the deficit. Advances and non-executed duties under 
the barter and other arrangements are behind this item, in addition to the capital inflow mentioned 
above. It should be stressed that the accounts where those assets were located have mostly been 
exhausted. 
      Thirdly, the data should not be taken for granted, since part of the trade transactions is not 
properly registered (export and import data are not realistic, so export and import are 
underestimated).3 The purpose of an underestimation of export is capital flight, while the 
underestimation of import serves to avoid tariff obligations. In addition, transactions within the 
shadow economy are vastly related to the sale of imported consumer goods, which further distorts 
the picture. Those who had access to foreign currency reserves blew up their accounts and placed 
the capital abroad. 
      Fourthly, there are constant "specific" monetary and non-monetary mechanisms of foreign 
currency purchase from the population, used for financing necessary imports. 
      With regards to other small and open economies, the FRY has a closed economy with a foreign 
trade share of 40% of the GDP in the respective period. In 1999 there was further decline of export 
and import, but given the G17 estimates on the GDP decline in comparison with the last year and 
the existing data on import and export, this relation is again 40%. 
      During the whole decade the relation between price control and the government's 
administrative measures was present in foreign trade exchange as well. A complicated system of 
import permits and limited access to the trade of "strategic" goods for the privileged are also 
characteristic of the existing foreign trade 
regime. 
      The banking sector operates with 
extremely problematic balances as the 
depositors have no confidence after their 
foreign currency savings were frozen and 
pyramidal schemes fell apart (around DM 
6,7 billion in 1999).4 The banking sector is 
concentrated, so only a few banks are 
important. After NATO bombing this 
process has gained a more apparent form.
      According to the research conducted 
by Transparency International, Yugoslavia 
was the most corrupted country in Europe 
in 1999. There are two basic reasons for 
such a result - the first is related to the 
share of shadow economy, which includes 
tax evasion and corruption; the second 
reason is based on discreet rights of the 
authorities and it is related to the rent-
seeking tendencies. 
      There are some institutional problems worth mentioning. Legal and economic regulations either 
do not correspond to needs, or they are not implemented. Markets of capital, foreign currency and 
money either do not exist or have almost been transferred to the black market. Accumulated debts 
towards budgetary beneficiaries, with inadequate protection of property rights and contracts and 
with pronounced administrating are just few of the negative characteristics of Serbian economy. 
      Taking into account the above analysis, one wonders how the population of the FRY managed 
to hold back social dissatisfaction. Political reasons aside, there are few social shock absorbers 
used by the economic policy. Contrary to a catastrophic decline of industrial production, both 
agriculture and electric power industry register stagnation, rather than a larger drop (see the chart 
bellow). Products made in these sectors, supported by price control, have been filling up the scarce 
consumer basket of an average citizen. 
      Naturally, as there is no free lunch, 
the dilemma of whom the bill went to still 
remains. A partial answer is given in the 
chart showing the electric power price in 
Serbia as compared to the world price. As 
the price is excessively depressed and 
given that infrastructure wears down 
slowly, but repairs relatively slowly as 
well, the consumers will bear the costs 
and negative effects in the long run. Not 
only are those sectors under price control. 
It is estimated that around 20% of all 
goods are under direct control of the 
government, while 30% are under its 
indirect control. 
      In addition to the above-mentioned 
factors, an important role is played by the 
shadow economy. According to the 
estimates, it accounts for additional 35-
50% of the GDP in the respective period. 
For most participants in the shadow economy, it is the economy of survival, so its exclusion from 
the analysis could lead to completely false deductions. 
   
 
  
1 National statistics does not yet regularly publish the GDP accounted in accordance with the SNA 
methodology. During the last year the data on GDP were revised. In the Statistical Year Book for 
1998, the following data were published (in US$ million): 1994-13862, 1995-14681, 1996-15548, 
1997-17000, while in the Year Book for 1999, the GDP was as follows: 1994-14285, 1995-15825, 
1996-16477, 1997-18158. Readers must be very careful due to inequality in the regional 
distribution and exclusion of the shadow economy. In addition, the problem of Kosovo's data was 
present during the whole respective period, as the official statistics included only a part of the 
activities in that region. Taking this into account, the GDP per capita for Serbia and Vojvodina 
between 1992-1999, should be increased by 400-600 US$, and a share of the shadow economy 
should be added. 
2 See: Methodological Supplement in "Economic Consequences of NATO Bombing: Estimate of 
the Damage and Finances Required for the Economic Reconstruction of Yugoslavia", Group 17, 
edited by Mladjan Dinkic. 
3 As FOB prices are used for export and CIF prices for import, it is realistic to expect a difference of 
10% on the basis of inclusion of additional cost not included in the CIF price. Only differences 
above this rate can be indicated as doubtful. The example of foreign trade exchange with Greece is 
rather illustrative. According to the Greek statistics export to Yugoslavia (FOB) for 1996 and 1997 
was 168,5 and 201,7 million US$ respectively, while the Yugoslav statistics registered import from 
Greece under the CIF (higher) price of 147,7 and 180,3 million US$. According to the data from the 
Foreign Trade Statistics of the FRY and International Trade Statistics, it is easy to conclude that 
around 40 million US$ are missing. 
4 According to the Law on foreign currency savings and taking into account 2% of capitalizing in the 
last two years. 
  Macroeconomic Rewiew by Mladjan Dinkic
  
      Economic activity 
      In 1999 there was a drastic decline in economic activity as compared to the year before. Such 
a decline is the result of NATO bombing, EU economic sanctions and ill conduct of the internal 
economic policy. 
      According to official statistics, the real GDP, calculated in compliance with SNA methodology, 
was 19,3% lower than in 1998, amounting at US$ 14,2 billion. Meanwhile, the GDP per capita was 
reduced to the level of US$ 1,700, which is US$ 400 lesser than in 1998. This account does not 
include Kosovo, while figures differ a great deal from the figures hitherto published. It should be 
born in mind that Kosovo's share in the GDP of the FRY was around 5%, while its share in the total 
population was even 20% (GDP per capita in Kosovo in 1998 was only US$ 470). Consequently, 
the exclusion of Kosovo from the account increased the sum of GDP per capita for a "new territory" 
of the FRY. However, the above data should not be taken for granted, for two reasons: (1) official 
statistics, due to political reasons, systematically overestimates the GDP value; (2) the above GDP 
account does not include turnover data in the shadow economy, which currently accounts between 
35%-50% of the total transactions in economy. 
      Industrial production in 1999 dropped by 24,1% in relation to 1998, and even 72% in relation to 
1989, according to official sources. In addition to that, the last year's economic decline was much 
higher in Serbia (-25,6%) than in Montenegro (-7,6%), since the industrial capacities in Montenegro 
came through the war unscathed. 
      Industrial production significantly decreased in the second quarter of 1999, during NATO 
bombardment. The bottom was touched in May 1999, when production was reduced to 16% of that 
achieved in 1989, which was the lowest level in the history of the FRY. Afterwards, the production 
registered continuous growth, so it reached the level of the first quarter by the end of the year. After 
the usual seasonal drop in January 2000, a relatively high statistical growth of production could be 
anticipated in the months to come, while it should be taken into account an exceptionally low 
starting position in relation to which growth is accounted. 
      Wages 
      The decrease in economic activity was accompanied by a dramatic fall of real wages. The 
average wage in the FRY amounted at DM 107 in 1999, while it was much lower in Serbia (DM 
102) than in Montenegro (DM 154). The average real wages in Serbia were by 34% lower than in 
1998, while in December 1999 they were 41% lower than in December 1998. In the last quarter of 
1999, the average wage in Serbia was reduced to the level bellow DM 90. As the year 2000 will be 
the electoral year, and given the experience from the electoral 1996/97 year, it could be anticipated 
that real wages would go up slowly in the next few months. 
      The gap between average wages in Serbia and Montenegro deepened during the last year. It 
amounted to DM 72 in favor of Montenegro. It should be born in mind that real wages in Serbia 
were higher than those in Montenegro until 1996, while in the former SFRY that difference was 
more explicit, since Montenegro used to be one of the least developed regions in the former state. 
Such a turn proves the depth of the crisis the Serbian economy confronts due to ill conduct. 
      Foreign Trade 
      Exports from Serbia in 1999 went down by 49% compared to the year before, while imports 
went down by one third (-33%), with the achieved foreign trade deficit of US$ 1.6 billion, which 
accounts for 11% of its GDP. As in the years before, the deficit was mostly financed from foreign 
accounts of the political establishment and by funds from numerous publicly unregistered state 
transactions, but also from the population (remittances from workers abroad). Contrary to Serbia, 
foreign trade of Montenegro registered no substantial deviations compared to the year before. The 
foreign trade deficit of Montenegro was slightly over US$ 200 million, accounting for 18% of its 
GDP. 
      The main foreign trade partners of the FRY in 1999 were Republika Srpska, Germany, Italy, 
Macedonia, Russia, Switzerlad and Bulgaria. The main export commodities from Serbia were fruits 
(US$ 91 million), wood (US$ 90 million) and copper (US$ 79 million), while the chief import articles 
were oil derivatives (US$ 457), various machinery (US$ 263 million), cars (US$ 218 million), cotton 
(US$ 139 million) and plastic items (US$ 133 million). Aluminum accounted for 70% of 
Montenegrin export, and oil derivatives made one third of the total export. 
      Monetary Movements 
      In the first half of the last year, including the period of NATO bombing, the National Bank of 
Yugoslavia (NBJ) applied a relatively restrictive monetary policy, due to which money offer did not 
exceed the planned and officially proclaimed limits. However, after Serbian top officials had 
proclaimed the beginning of reconstruction works, monetary faucets were turned on and the NBJ 
started to finance higher and higher budgetary deficit by issuing the money without hard currency 
backing. A large portion of the monetary expansion the NBJ realized through direct investments 
from primary issue. Those "inflationary investments" rose by 135% in comparison with 1998. By the 
end of 1999, nominal money supply (M1) rose by 50% compared to that at the end of 1998. Such 
an inflationary financing of public expenditures and general economic depression resulted in 
sudden drop in real money demand. Consequently, real money supply, accounting for DM 2.7 
billion in the second half of 1997, was reduced to the level of DM 740 million at the end of 1999. 
      To protect itself from the unrestrained monetary policy of the NBY, Montenegro introduced a 
dual currency system in November 1999, thus legalizing the German mark as a parallel tender on 
its territory. Serbia's reaction was very rough - it interrupted all payment transactions with 
Montenegro, which resulted in a speed withdrawal of dinars from Montenegro and its factual 
separation from the FRY's monetary system. Already in January 2000, around 2/3 of all 
transactions in Montenegro were conducted in German marks (money supply /M1/ in Montenegro 
is about DEM 65 million). It is certain that Serbia's rigid attitude against Montenegro will initiate 
further withdrawal of dinars, while Montenegro will implement the officially "dollarized" monetary 
system. 
      Exchange Rate and Prices 
      According to official statistics, the last year's inflation amounted at 42%, measured by retail 
price indices. Meanwhile, the annual exchange rate growth on the black market floated between 
150% (black market exchange rate) and 170% (giro exchange rate). Such a disproportion between 
exchange rate growth and price growth is a consequence of: (1) administrative price control on 
large number of products; (2) considerable data forgery on price growth by official statistics, which 
was particularly noticeable in the last two months of 1999. Repressed inflation is characteristic for 
Serbia. Strong administrative price control, introduced for maintaining social peace and 
unrestricted monetary policy by the NBY, conducted in the second half of 1999, provoked a sudden 
growth of the black market exchange rate and shortages of all goods which prices were frozen 
(cooking oil, milk, sugar, bread, petrol, etc.). 
      In the forthcoming period official devaluation of the dinar can be anticipated. By the end of 
January 2000, the official exchange rate was even 3,3-4 times lower than the black market 
exchange rate. Bearing in mind that foreign currency reserves were significantly enlarged by a 
"Chinese gift" of US$ 300 million (before that the operational foreign currency reserves, without 
gold, amounted at US$ 130 million, according to our estimates), we can conclude that the National 
Bank of Yugoslavia currently has sufficient reserves to defend the newly established official 
exchange rate. 
 
